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The law, like life, must not go backward nor tarry with yesterday.
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Time to Abolish Parent-Child Tort Immunity: A Call
to Repudiate Mississippi's Gift to the American
Family'
JOEL BERMAN*
Your children are not your children..
They are the sons and daughters of Life's longing for itself.
They come through you but not from you,
And though they are with you yet they belong not to you.
You may give them your love but not your thoughts,
For they have their own thoughts.
You may house their bodies but not their souls,
For their souls dwell in the house of tomorrow, which you cannot
visit, not even in your dreams.
You may strive to be like them, but seek not to make them like
you.
For life goes not backward nor tarries with yesterday.'
-KAHLIL GIBRAN, THE PROPHET,
71st Printing (1964).
1. INTRODUCTION
The law, like life, must not go backward nor tarry with yesterday. Like
children, the law must grow and learn and, hopefully, become wiser as
it matures to reflect the ever-changing environment of our society. One
of the most important justifications for such change is the proper use
by thoughtful, progressive courts of the Latin maxim cessante ratione
* J.D. University of Florida, Assoc. Professor Nova University Center for the
Study of Law. The author is indebted to his capable research assistants Alan Ehrlich,
Gerald Cowan and Ellen Kracoff.
1. Parental Immunity: Mississippi's Gift to the American Family, 7 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 597 (1971).
2. KAHLIL GIBRAN, THE PROPHET (1964).
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legis cessant ipsa lex which means that whenever the reasons given to
justify a rule never really existed at all, the rule itself should never have
come into being. The idea of immunity in tort actions between parents
and children is such a rule. According to the view that the reasons for
such immunity never existed at all, or alternately that they have ceased
to exist, the time has come for abolishing the rule in Florida.
The parental immunity rule bars the right of an unemancipated
minor child to bring an action for a tort against a parent; the rule
similarly prevents a parent from bringing a tort action against an un-
emancipated minor child. Under this doctrine of parent-child tort im-
munity, like that of any status-based legal immunity, the opportunity
of the injured party for justice does not depend on the nature of his
injury or on the type of act which caused the wrong, but solely on the
status or relationship of the wrongdoer vis-a-vis the victim. Thus, pur-
suant to the general rule, a tortfeasor, by virtue merely of his status as
a parent or an unemancipated minor, will be immune from liability for
personal injuries suffered by his child or his parent. The legal confusion
caused by a multitude of objections to, and limitations on, such an
unqualified bar to suit between family members was mentioned in a
1972 annotation of this subject:
The law with respect to the liability of parents for the negligent injuries
of their children has been, and continues to be, in a highly unsatisfactory
state, as evidenced by the great variety or identifiably distinguishable
holdings, the differences in emphasis in decisions ostensibly following
similar rules, the shifting of positions; ...the proliferation of excep-
tions and limitations to varyingly defined general rules, and the appar-
ently completely irreconcilable basic premises invoked as the fundamen-
tal rationale.3
A major cause of the confusion that has developed is due to changing
economic realities, "particularly the advent of the automobile and the
prevalence of liability insurance."4 (Emphasis Added)
This article will review the background, origin, and development
of parent-child tort immunity and will analyze the basic premises and
3. Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 909 (1972). (Liability of Parent for Injury to Unemanci-
pated Child Caused by Parent's Negligence is the leading annotation on the subject.
This article has frequently been cited in both law review articles and cases.)
4. Id. at 910.
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rationales invoked and used by various courts to either justify, limit, or
abrogate the rule. The application of the immunity doctrine by Florida
courts will also be discussed, along with the conflict between such im-
munity and tort goals and policies enunciated by the Florida courts
and legislature in the 1970's. The inconsistencies in the immunity doc-
trine, and present public policy which is in conflict with such immunity
rule, give rise to the author's opinion that Florida should abrogate the
parental immunity rule and join the growing number of jurisdictions
which now allow tort actions between parents and children. Whatever
justification may have once existed for the immunity rule, if indeed any
true justification ever existed, no longer exists, and the doctrine's day
has long since passed.
2. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF PARENT-
CHILD TORT IMMUNITY
A. Background
Immunity has never been a generally accepted rule in instances of
injury resulting from tortious behavior. The general rule is and has
been that liability should result for the infliction of injury from negli-
gent or other tortious conduct; immunity from such liability is the ex-
ception.' Indeed, even specifically with respect to parents and their chil-
dren, early legal scholars were of the nearly unanimous opinion that
liability of the parent was the rule for tortious behavior, especially for
actions resulting in personal injury to a child.'
While there is no record in early English law of any suit by an
unemancipated minor against a parent, there is also no record of any
holding that such a suit could not be maintained. To the contrary,
there are indications in several early English cases involving children
injured by teachers that tortious injuries inflicted by parents or those
persons in loco parentis were actionable, with civil liability an appro-
5. President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, ID F.2d 810
(D.C. Cir. 1942); Muskopf v. Coming Hospital Dist., 11 Cal. Rptr. 211, 359 P.2d 457
(1961); Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721 (W.Va. 1976). The principle enunciated in these
cases corresponds to the trend in modem tort law which stresses accident victim com-
pensation as will be discussed infra.
6. Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 584; 118 S.E. 12, 19 (1923).
27 1Parent-Child Tort Immunity4:1980
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priate remedy.' Years later when the parental immunity issue came
before a Scottish court, the judges agreed that although it was a case of
first impression under Scottish law, there was no common law immu-
nity rule, and unanimously held that an unemancipated minor could
sue his parent for parental injuries resulting from negligent conduct.8
Further support for the rule of liability for tortious behavior of
parents and those to whom parental authority has been delegated is
contained in several early American cases involving situations of exces-
sive or unreasonable punishment of a minor,9 gross neglect of a mi-
nor,10 or conduct which threatened a minor's life or health.1
Compounding the problem of the lack of early authority for par-
ent-child tort immunity was the vell-established common law principle,
adopted in most states, that unemancipated children could sue their
parents for damages caused to their prolerty, or over contracts, wills,
inheritances and the like." So, as the 19th Century drew to a close,
there was almost no legal authority supporting a doctrine of tort im-
munity between parents and children, and clear precedent existed
against similar immunity for causes of action sounding in other areas.
No strict rule had yet been formulated. The stage was set.
B. Origin
It was not until 1891 that any court in the United States had
placed any limitation whatsoever on the right of an unemancipated
child to recover in tort against a parent. In that year, the Supreme
Court of Mississippi decided the case of Hewlett v. George' 3 where a
7. Regina v. Hopley, 175 Eng. Rep. 1024 (1860); Fitzgerald v. Northcote, 176
Eng. Rep. 734 (1865).
8. Young v. Rankin, [1934] S.L.T. 445, Sess. Cas. 499.
9. Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1859).
10. Nelson v. Johansen, 18 Neb. 180, 24 N.W. 730 (1885).
11. Patterson v. Nutter, 78 Me. 509, 7 A. 273 (1886).
12. Roberts v. Roberts, 145 Eng. Rep. 399 (1657); Lamb v. Lamb, 146 N.Y.
317, 41 N.E. 26 (1895); Hollingsworth v. Beaver, 59 S.W 464 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900);
Preston v. Preston, 102 Conn. 96, 128 A. 292 (1925); King v. Sells, 193 Wash. 294, 75
P.2d 130 (1938); Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960). It is also a well
established principle of law in Florida, that an unemancipated minor child may sue his
parents with respect to contracts, wills and other property rights. See 24 FLA. JUR.,
Parent and Child §22 (1959).
13. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
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minor daughter, who was married but living apart from her husband,
brought an action against the estate of her deceased mother for per-
sonal injuries inflicted as a result of being wrongfully imprisoned by the
mother in an insane asylum. In a short opinion completely devoid of
any citations of legal or case authority, the Mississippi court held that
solely because of the parent-child relationship, the child was not enti-
tled to maintain the action. In so holding, the justices created a legal
rule and precedent based purely on their own opinions of what public
policy was and should be. The often quoted reason for the establish-
ment of this rule was stated by the court as follows:
0
The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a sound
public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families and the best
interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right to appear in court
in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at
the hands of the parent.1
With no further analysis than this, and with no basis in the common
law or in statutes or prior cases, the doctrine of parent-child tort im-
munity was born. Its ramifications are still being felt today.
Twelve years later another jurisdiction followed Mississippi's lead
in McKelvey v. McKelvey." The Supreme Court of Tennessee in Mc-
Kelvey affirmed the dismissal of a suit by a minor child to recover
damages for cruel and unhuman treatment inflicted by her stepmother
at the instigation and with the consent of her natural father. After cit-
ing Hewlett as the only previous case authority forbidding a child's suit
against a parent, the court proceeded to create the myth of the exis-
tence of an entrenched common law basis for the parental immunity
rule," completely ignoring the fact that the Hewlett court had men-
tioned no such established common law rule. All that remained to be
done was to carry the logic to some extreme conclusion and test the
rule to determine its limitations. Such an opportunity presented itself
just two years later in the state of Washington.
In Roller v. Roller," the Supreme Court of Washington was faced
with a civil action where a minor daughter sought damages for injuries
14. Id. at 887.
15. 11 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
16. Id. at 665.
17. 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
29 1
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inflicted as a result of being raped by her father. Even though the fa-
ther had been convicted of this violent and shocking criminal offense,
the court held that the daughter's rape would not be sufficient grounds
for allowing her to sue the father for damages. In reversing the trial
court's judgment in favor of the daughter, the court reasoned that any
other result would threaten family harmony and tranquility. 8 The
opinion went on to perpetuate the myth that commenced with McKel-
vey that there was a well-established common law rule absolutely
preventing any tort action from being brought by a minor child against
a parent.
In this manner, Roller announced and justified the fact that the
parental tort immunity rule, created in Hewlett and stated in McKel-
vey to be based on common law principles, was an absolute bar to suits
by children against their parents.
C. Establishment
The opinions in Hewlett, McKelvey and Roller have been said to
"constitute the great trilogy upon which American rule of parent-child
tort immunity is based."" Since the rule was enunciated as absolute,
even though all three cases involved intentional torts, it was not diffi-
cult for courts in those and other jurisdictions throughout the country
to uiiiformly apply the immunity rule in subsequent cases, whether the
tortious conduct of the parent was intentional, willful and wanton, or
negligent in nature.2 0
18. Id.
19. Comments, Tort Actions Between Members of the Family-Husband and
Wife-Parent and Child, 26 Mo. L. REV. 152, 182 (1961).
20. Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N.W. 763 (1908); Small v. Morri-
son, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N.E.
128 (1924); Mannion v. Mannion, 3 N.J. Misc. 68, 129 A. 431 (Cir. Ct. 1925); Mata-
rese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925); Elias v. Collins, 237 Mich. 175, 211
N.W. 88 (1926); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927); Sorrentino v.
Sorrentino, 222 App. Div. 835, 226 N.Y.S. 907 (1928); aff'd without opinion 248 N.Y.
628, 162 N.E. 551 (1928); Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929); Kelly
v. Kelly, 158 S.C. 517, 155 S.E. 888 (1930); Trudell v. Leatherby, 212 Cal. 678, 300 P.
7 (1931); Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S.E. 708 (1931); Securo v. Securo,
110 W.Va. 1, 156 S.E. 750 (1931); Krohngold v. Krohngold, 181 N.E. 910 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1932); Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930); Owens v. Auto
Mut. Indemnity Co., 235 Ala. 9, 177 So. 133 (1937); Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832,
6
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The often cited case of Small v.Morrison,21 decided by the Su-
preme Court of North Carolina in 1923, helped to firmly establish the
parent-child tort immunity rule. Small is indicative of the personal phi-
losophy and narrow interpretation of public policy that underlies the
great majority of decisions upholding the immunity doctrine. A nine
year old girl sued her father and his insurance company for injuries
suffered in an automobile accident allegedly resulting from the father's
negligent driving. The court reviewed prior opinions and several legal
writings dealing with parental immunity and concluded that the child
had no right to sue her father in tort. The majority found that its posi-
tion was supported by all authorities on the subject, with no authority
to the contrary, 22 a statement clearly contra to the cases and scholarly
works mentioned previously herein. It justified its decision as being
consonant with natural justice and in keeping with the eternal order of
things,2 3 and further emphasized the importance of the immunity rule
in maintaining the peace and tranquility of the home.24 The majority
was so confident of its position that its rationale was ultimately
founded upon Biblical and spiritual comparisons such as the following:
"Honor thy father and thy mother that thy days may be long upon the
land which the Lord thy God giveth thee ..."
Small also contains a dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Clark
which has been called the "first strong, well-reasoned, and extensively
quoted attack on the immunity doctrine .,2 6 The dissent carefully
114 S.W.2d 468 (1938). See also Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 904 (1972). In a period of ap-
proximately thirty years, the parent-child immunity rule became firmly entrenched in
almost every jurisdiction of this country. The above cases represent a sampling of these
decisions adopting the immunity rule.
21. 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923).
22. Id. at 13.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 16.
25. Id.
26. Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 904, 911 (1972). As will be shown infra, Justice Clark's
reasoning has been adopted by an increasing number of courts today. In Small, he
stated:
Never before now has this court ever been called upon to take the backward
track and bar the claim of justice to the weak, or to "outlaw" the children of the
land from their just demand to have their pleas heard for redress of wrongs.
118 S.E. at 21.
The doors of the Temple of Justice should always stand wide open, and to every-
7
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analyzed all prior authority and decided that neither the common law,
statutory law, nor any judicial decision prior to Hewlett would forbid
the maintenance of a tort action by a minor child against his parents.
It concluded by calling for the courts to lead the way to greater justice
in the redress of such grievances.
By 1930, when Dunlap v. Dunlap27 came before the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire, the parental immunity rule was accepted in
jurisdictions throughout the United States. In Dunlap, a .sixteen year
old boy sued his father for injuries suffered when a platform collapsed
while he was working for his contractor-father. For the first time in
any American jurisdiction, the majority opinion announced that the
doctrine of parent-child tort immunity was not absolute, and that when
a minor child was employed by a parent who carried liability insurance
and when such minor was injured in his capacity as employee, the child
could legitimately sue his parent for such negligence. The immunity
doctrine was said.to arise from a disability to sue, and not from a lack
of any violated duty." The disability should, thus, not be raised when
the allowance of a suit would fail to do violence to the policy underly-
ing the immunity rule, namely the protection of family harmony and
parental control.?
Although the court only created an exception to the immunity rule
where a master-servant relationship had replaced a parent-child rela-
tionship, it criticized the rule in its entirety after carefully reviewing
early English and American text-writers, prior judicial precedent,
American law review articles, and public policy considerations. Dunlap
has been considered:
a strong theoretical and broad-based attack on the concept of parental
tort immunity generally, revealing its uncertain and recent origin and
criticizing as vulnerable its legal foundation, particularly in view of the
one. Least of all they should be closed to the weak and "those who have no
helper," for most of all they need its protection.
Id. at 24.
The Master said, "Suffer little children to come unto me and forbid them not."
Certainly justice (sic) should not forbid them to plead their wrongs at her altar.
Id. at 25.
27. 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930).
28. Id. at 915.
29. Id.
8
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liability of parents for contract and property wrongs, and the breakdown
of tort immunity as between husband and wife, as well as the practical
effect of the general prevalence of insurance coverage in various situa-
tions involving negligent injury to the unemancipated child."
Dunlap did not, however, mark a turning point in the history of
the parental immunity rule. This was evidenced just four years later in
Briggs v. City of Philadelphia,3 1 where the Superior Court of Penn-
sylvania, although citing Dunlap, upheld the doctrine by indicating the
deeply rooted policy concerns underlying the rule. 2
D. Justifications:
A "rule which so incongruously shields conceded wrongdoing
bears a heavy burden of justification." Since the establishment of par-
ent-child tort immunity, most courts confronting the question have
given specific and distinct reasons for upholding the doctrine. The most
frequent justifications cited for the immunity rule include: (1) domestic
harmony and tranquility; (2) parental care, discipline, and control; (3)
danger of fraud and collusion; and (4) depletion of family resources.
These rationales lack persuasive authority when closely scrutinized.
(1) DOMESTIC HARMONY AND TRANQUILITY
The preservation of family harmony and domestic tranquility is
the leading justification used by courts to support the parental immu-
nity rule.3 Again and again, courts have proclaimed their belief that
30. Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 904, 911 (1972).
31. 112 Pa. Super. 50, 170 A. 871 (1934).
32. Id.
33. Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 475; 215 N.Y.S.2d 35, 38; 174 N.E.2d
718, 721 (1961) (Fuld, J., Dissenting).
34. The family harmony rationale has been emphasized by every jurisdiction
adopting the parent-child tort immunity rule as the foundation for such doctrine. See
Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905); Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577,
118 S.E. 12 (1923); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927); Mesite v.
Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929); Securo v. Securo, 110 W.Va. 1, 156 S.E.
750 (1931); Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); Cowgill v. Boock,
189 Or. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950) (The policy of the law should preserve and maintain
the security, peace and tranquility of the home.); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 I11.2d 608, 131
9
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injuries sustained by minor children must remain uncompensated. The
counter-argument is that it is the tortious injury itself, rather than the
threatened litigation, that disrupts domestic life. 5 When the wrong has
been committed, the harm, if any, to the basic fabric of the family has
already been done and the course of rancor and discord already intro-
duced into family relations." The most acrimonious family disputes
concern lawsuits over property and contract rights. Such suits have
never been barred by any immunity rule; it is illogical to deny tort
actions because they are disruptive of family harmony.37
The weakness of this rationale is further demonstrated by noting
that in many reported cases in this area involving automobile accidents
where liability insurance is present, family harmony would be disrupted
far more by denying recovery than by granting it.38 Finally, if the inter-
est in family harmony is important enough to prevent minor children
from suing their parents, it is difficult to rationalize and understand
why other family members may sue each other when the possible dis-
N.E.2d 525 (1956); Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App.2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (App. Ct.
1968). The public policy involved is the interest of the State in maintaining harmony,
avoiding strife, and insuring a proper atmosphere of cooperation, discipline and under-
standing in the family.
35. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971).
36. Most of the decisions adopting the family harmony rationale have not specif-
ically discussed whether the immunity rule would advance this justification with respect
to their particular fact situations. The following cases have critically examined whether
family harmony and domestic tranquility are, in fact, preserved by the doctrine of im-
munity. See Tamashiro v. DeGama, 51 Hawaii 74, 450 P.2d 998 (1969); Baits v. Baits,
273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 97 (Mass.
1975); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash.2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84
N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930); Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 16, 22 N.E.2d 254 (1939). See
also cases cited in notes 37 and 38 infra.
37. Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952). See also Silesky v.
Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968); Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 142
N.W.2d 66 (1966); Gaudreau v. Gaudreau, 106 N.W. 551, 215 A.2d 695 (1965); Torts
Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 1030, 1056 (1930).
38. Gaudreau v. Gaudreau, 106 N.W. 551, 215 A.2d 695 (1965); Gelbman v.
Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 245 N.E.2d 192 (1969); Lee v. Comer,
224 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1976); Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Sorenson v.
Sorenson, 339 N.E.2d 907 (Mass. 1975); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351
(1971); Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968); Goller v. White, 20
Wis.2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
10
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turbance to domestic tranquility is just as real."
(2) PARENTAL CARE, DISCIPLINE, AND CONTROL
A second reason frequently offered by courts to justify the paren-
tal immunity rule is that to permit a minor child to bring a tort action
against his parents is to impair society's interest in maintaining paren-
tal authority with respect to the care, discipline, and control of minor
children and to encourage such children to disobey their parents."
These protected parental interests have been deemed to consist of the
right and obligation of parents to maintain the home, to nurture and
protect their children and guard them from danger, to care for them
and to chastise them when necessary." A fear exists among courts that
to allow a minor child to bring a lawsuit against his parents would
alter the natural process of child development and damage the very
fabric of their relationship." Many of those jurisdictions which have
embraced a limited abrogation of the immunity rule view potential in-
terference with parental care, discipline, and control as the one viable
circumstance that should continue to prevent minor children from be-
ing able to sue their parents in tort. 3
39. Comments: Tort Actions Between Members of the Family-Husband and
Wife-Parent and Child, 26 Mo. L. REV. 152, 188 (1961). In this author's opinion,
this law review comment presents the finest detailed analysis of this topic to date.
40. McKelvey v. McKelvey, 11 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903); Small v. Morri-
son, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787
(1927); Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A.753 (1929); Matarese v. Matarese,
47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925); Rodebaugh v. Grand Truck Western R.R. Co., 4
Mich. App. 559, 145 N.W.2d 401 (1966). As will be discussed infra, except for domes-
tic harmony and tranquility, the parental control argument has been the most fre-
quently cited justification for the continued retention of the parent-child immunity rule.
41. Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wis.2d 75, 158 N.W.2d 341 (1968); Rodebaugh v.
Grand Truck Western R.R. Co., 4 Mich. App. 559, 145 N.W.2d 401 (1966); Borst v.
Borst, 41 Wash.2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952). In all jurisdictions, criminal sanctions
have long been imposed for parental acts violating parental obligations to their chil-
dren. See FLA. STAT. §§ 827.01-827.07 (1977) for the criminal penalties relating to cer-
tain delineated breaches of parental obligations to their children.
42. See Holodook v. Spencer, 26 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338 (1974) for a strong
statement as to the judicial concern in this area.
43. See Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968); Rigdon v.
Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1971); Gross v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 158 N.J.
Super. 442, 386 A.2d 442 (1978); Small v. Rockfeld, 66 N.J. 231, 330 A.2d 335 (1974).
1 4:1980
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The parental control argument was dealt with, and rejected by, the
Dunlap court which stated that the idea that children would become
unruly if given a right to legal redress was farfetched." The problem in
the typical case arises where a child is injured by his parent's negligent
operation of an automobile. A suit in most instances is brought at the
behest of the parents for the very purpose of allowing the child to re-
cover against their liability insurer." Any judgment rendered will, in all
probability, be paid by the insurer46 thereby providing the family with a
fund for the child. The interests of parental control and discipline are,
thus, not infringed upon nor weakened.
This rationale becomes further suspect by noting that lawsuits in-
volving property and contract rights, which have never been barred by
any immunity rule, may be as disruptive to the family unit as those
involving negligently inflicted injuries.47 Furthermore, the courts that
justify the immunity rule on this ground make no distinction between
suits brought by parents against children or those brought by children
against parents, although this justification is applicable only to cases
where a child is suing parent."*
(3) DANGER OF FRAUD AND COLLUSION
In upholding the parental immunity rule, a number of courts have
indicated concern over the proposition that to allow minor children to
maintain negligence actions against their parents would foster fraud
and collusion." The cases involving fraud and collusion have centered
See note 40 supra.
44. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930).
45. Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d
472, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35, 174 N.E.2d 718 (1961). A good majority of reported cases deal-
ing with the parent-child tort immunity rule have involved motor vehicle accidents
where liability insurance existed.
46. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 907 (Mass. 1975); Lee v. Comer, 224
S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1976).
47. Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash.2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
48. Comments: Tort Actions Between Members of the Family-Husband and
Wife-Parent and Child, 26 Mo. L. REv. 152, 189 (1961).
49. Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash.2d
642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952); Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938);
Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Dennis v. Walker, 284 F.Supp. 413
(D.D.C. 1968); Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N.E. 961 (1901). The
A
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around situations where liability insurance is present, and the insurers
have raised the spectre of children and parents plotting, against them."0
An analysis of this rationale demonstrates that the possibility of
fraud and collusion exists not only in situations relating to the parent-
child tort immunity rule, but in all liability insurance cases where suits
have been allowed.5 1 Courts have entertained tort actions between driv-
ers and passengers of vehicles and close friends and family members
other than parents and children without the cry of collusion preventing
a consideration of the facts on their merits.5" Our legal system itself is
quite capable of ferreting out those fraudulent claims that may exist
without having to indiscriminately bar all meritorious claims due to a
fear of fraud.1
The fraud and collusion argument is, in actuality, entirely incom-
patible with the family harmony and tranquility argument most often
advanced by courts in support of the parental immunity rule. 4 The for-
mer rationale is premised upon the closeness of the family members
whereas the latter rationale is based upon the hostility and anger a suit
would bring so as to disturb the peace of the home. This blatant incon-
sistency is explained by taking into account the fact that the existence
of liability insurance is considered by courts when dealing with the pos-
sibility of fraud but is disregarded when the same courts discuss family
harmony."5 The illogical nature of this approach is indicative of the
cases decided in the last twenty years have, contra to these decisions, downplayed the
fraud and collusion rationale as a justification for the retention of the parent-child tort
immunity rule. The abrogation of Automobile Guest Statutes in most jurisdictions has
indicated the decreasing importance of fraud and collusion as a determining factor in
the threshold question of whether a lawsuit should be allowed to be maintained. Flor-
ida had abrogated its guest statute in 1972. See FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1937) (Repealed
by Laws 1972, c. 72-1 § 1).
50. Barlow v. Iblings, 156 N.W.2d 105 (Iowa 1968).
51. Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282 (1970).
52. Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966).
53. An example of the courts' rejection of this fraud rationale is indicated in the
trend toward the elimination of Automobile Guest Statutes which have been primarily
based on the fear of fraud and collusion between drivers and passengers. Florida re-
pealed its Guest Statute in 1972. (FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1972)). See Id.,; Tamashiro v.
DeGama, 450 P.2d 898 (Hawaii 1969); Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013 (Nev. 1974);
France v. A.P.A. Transport Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970).
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precarious base upon which the immunity rule is built.
(4) DEPLETION OF FAMILY REsOURCES
Some courts have noted that to permit a child to sue his parents in
tort would deplete the family exchequer to the detriment of other chil-
dren by reducing both the amount of money available for their care
and the shares they would receive upon the death of their parents.56 The
argument assumes an equality among the children and an intention on
the part of parents to treat their children equally.
This assumption of equality conveniently omits the fact that the
child recovering has been injured while other children and family mem-
bers have not. Furthermore, the notion of equality seems to connote
that a child has a vested right to a specific distributive share of the
property of his parents. No such right exists.5" Courts advancing this
rationale have also not addressed themselves to the question as to why
an injured minor child should be treated differently than a third party
who has always been allowed to recover against one who is a parent;
both situations would allegedly deplete family resources.
A number of courts have emphasized the prevalence of liability
insurance as a complete refutation of the argument that recovery by a
child against his parent will deplete family resources. The insurance
company is the real party in interest and is the source from which the
injured child receives compensation.
E. Exceptions
The exceptions and limitations placed upon the immunity rule
have been many and varied. In fact, the doctrine of parent-child tort
immunity "is so limited by these exceptions it could be said liability is
56. Roller v. Roller, 27 Wash.2d 242, 79 P. 788 (1905); Small v. Morrison, 185
N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa 713, 156 N.W.2d 105
(1968); Orefice v. Albert, 237 So.2d 142 (Fla. 1970); Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App.
1, 163 S.E. 708 (1932). This argument assumes that the negligent parent will pay the
damage award, an assumption which is unrealistic given the widespread prevalence of
liability insurance.
57. Rice v. Andrews, 127 Misc. 826, 217 N.Y.S. 528 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
58. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa.
372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971). See also notes 70-75 infra.
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the rule and immunity the exception."'" These exceptions have centered
around cases where courts consider the parent-child relationship to
have been abandoned or where the tortious act of the parent does not
arise out of the family relationship." The exceptions most often cited
involve fact situations where (1) the minor child is emancipated;6 (2)
the parent's conduct is characterized as intentional or willful and wan-
ton;12 (3) the parent is acting in his business or vocational capacity and
not in his parental capacity when causing the injury; 3 and (4) the par-
ent and/or child dies as a result of the parent's negligent act.64
Some of these exceptions are clearly justified when examined in
light of the policies underlying the parental immunity rule. Where the
parents and/or children are dead as a result of the negligence of the
parents, numerous courts have allowed lawsuits to be maintained on
the ground that death terminates the family relationship; and, hence,
family harmony and discipline would not be disturbed. 5 Where a par-
59. Comments: Torts-Parent and Child Immunity-Suit Against Parent's Es-
tate, 59 Ky. L. J. 205, 207 (1970).
60. Teramano v. Teramano, 6 Ohio St.2d 117, 216 N.E.2d 375 (1966); Com-
ments: Parent-Child Tort Immunity: A Rule in Need of Change, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV.
191 (1972).
61. Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N.W. 763 (1908); Ciani v. Ciani,
127 Misc. Rep. 304, 215 N.Y.S. 767 (1926); Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So.
885 (1891); Groh v. W.O. Krahn, Inc., 271 N.W. 374 (Wis. 1937); Wood v. Wood, 135
Conn. 280, 62 A.2d 586 (1948); Wright v. Wright, 229 N.C. 503, 50 S.E.2d 541 (1948);
Belleson v. Skillbeck, 185 Minn. 537, 242 N.W. 1 (Minn. 1932); Mannion v. Mannion,
3 N.J. Misc. R. 68, 129 A. 431 (N.J. Cir. Ct. 1925); Cannon v. Cannon, 387 N.Y. 425,
40 N.E.2d 236 (1942); and Smith v. Kaufman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971).
62. Cogwill v. Boock, 218 P.2d 445 (Or. 1950); Rodebaugh v. Grand Truck
Western R.R. Co., 4 Mich. App. 559, 145 N.W.2d 401 (1966); Aboussie v. Aboussie,
270 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1954); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill.2d 608, 131
N.E.2d 525 (1956); Cannon v. Cannon, 387 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d 236 (1942); Mahnke
v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal.2d 421, 289 P.2d
218 (1955).
63. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930); Worrell v. Worrell, 4
S.E.2d 343 (Va. 1939); Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 592, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952); Den-
nis v. Walker, 284 F.Supp. 413 (D.D.C. 1968); Trevarton v. Trevarton, 151 Col. 418,
378 P.2d 64 (1963).
64. Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957); Palcsey v. Tepper. 71 N.J.
Super. 294, 176 A.2d 818 (1962); Hale v. Hale, 312 Ky. 867, 230 S.W.2d 610 (1950);
Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314, 211 A.2d 410 (1965); Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.
2d 68 (Mo. 1960).
65. See cases cited note 64 supra.
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ent has intentionally or willfully and wantonly injured his child, the
intrinsic peace and harmony of the family is greatly disrupted, if not
destroyed, by the very nature of the tortious act. It will not be further
disturbed by a severely injured child recovering from his parent for the
parent's reprehensible conduct. 6
The other exceptions do not so easily fit into the framework of the
policies underlying the immunity rule. All courts have permitted an
emancipated child to sue his parents on the ground that the parent-
child relationship is terminated since the child is his own master and no
longer under the control of his parents." Although the policy of paren-
tal discipline and control may no longer be of significance when a child
is emancipated, the fact remains that parents and children may still
constitute a very closely knit family structure. A lawsuit by an emanci-
pated child may be just as destructive to family harmony and tranquil-
ity as one maintained by a child who is under the control of his par-
ents. Furthermore, the same danger of fraud and collusion exists
whether the child is emancipated or unemancipated.
The courts that have held a parent liable to his child for the par-
ent's tortious conduct committed while acting in his business capacity
have reasoned that an action should be permitted since the parent's
negligence did not relate at all to the discharge of parental duties."
Typical of these cases is Trevarton v. Trevarton,9 where a father, en-
gaged in the business of cutting lumber, negligently injured his son by
allowing a tree to be dragged over him while he was sleeping. In grant-
ing recovery to the child, the court did not concern itself with whether
its decision was consonant with the policy justifications underlying the
immunity doctrine. It did not discuss the disruption of family har-
mony, or the disturbance of parental discipline and control, or the pos-
sibility of fraud and collusion against the liability insurer of the father,
although these policies were as applicable here as in any other case.
Rather than abrogate the parent-child tort immunity rule, the
courts have created this series of exceptions to justify the maintenance
of actions by injured children against their parents. To allow such suits
courts have, in certain instances, conveniently overlooked the policy ra-
66. See cases cited note 62 supra.
67. See cases cited note 61 supra.
68. See cases cited note 63 supra.
69. 378 P.2d 640 (Colo. 1963).
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tionalbs so often quoted in support of the doctrine.
F. Abrogation of Parent-Child Tort Immunity
(1) PARTIAL ABROGATION OF IMMUNITY
A wave of recent decisions has abrogated the parental immunity
rule to the extent of permitting actions by unemancipated children
against their parents for negligently-inflicted injuries arising out of
automobile accidents.70 These courts have taken judicial notice of the al-
most universal existence and availability of liability insurance and have
indicated that although such insurance cannot create liability where
there was no previous legal duty, it is a proper element to consider
when discussing the ratonale underlying the immunity doctrine. It is
the unanimous opinion of these courts that where liability insurance is
present, there is little, if any, possibility that family harmony, parental
discipline and control and family resources will be disturbed. In fact,
where liability insurance exists, an action by the injured child against
his parent will be beneficial rather than detrimental to the family
relationship.71
Two jurisdictions have abrogated the parental immunity rule in
automobile accident cases only to the extent of the parent's liability
insurance coverage. 72 However, the great majority of courts eliminating
parental immunity in such cases have not limited their abrogation of
70. Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86,
471 P.2d 282 (1970); Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1976); Smith v. Kauff-
man, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971); Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d
169 (1972); Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (Minn. 1968);
Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192 (1969); Schenk v. Schenk, 100
IIl.App.2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (1968); Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669 (Del. 1976).
These recent cases correspond with the legislative and judicial emphasis on accident
victim compensation through mechanisms such as no-fault automobile liability insur-
ance, the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act and the waiver of governmen-
tal and charitable immunities.
71. See cases cited note 38 supra.
72. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 907 (Mass. 1975); Williams v. Williams,
369 A.2d 669 (Del. 1976); See also the concurring opinion of Justice Neely in Lee v.
Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1976). Such abrogation reflects changing conditions
and circumstances where the existence of liability insurance has become the rule, not
the exception.
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the doctrine to situations specifically involving insurance, since they ac-
knowledge that insurance is present in almost all cases and that with-
out insurance, it is highly unlikely that any action will be instituted at
all. These courts have balanced the competing considerations and have
concluded that the interest in securing legal redress to injured children
outweighs the policy factors supporting immunity in such cases.13
Furthermore, two courts have indicated that if the parent-child
tort immunity is to be changed with regard to the automobile accident
problem, such change should be by legislative decree and not by
judicial fiat. The legislatures of these states have acted upon these judi-
cial suggestions and have partially abrogated the immunity rule as it
relates to injuries caused by the negligent operation of an automobile.74
(2) PARTIAL RETENTION OF IMMUNITY
The trend among the courts that have recently reviewed the par-
ent-child tort immunity rule has been to abrogate the doctrine with the
noteworthy exception of retaining such immunity for parental conduct
involving the authority, care, discipline, and control of their children.
The avowed purpose behind this limited retention of the immunity rule
has been "preserving, fostering and maintaining a proper and whole-
some parent-child relationship in a family' 75 to enable parents to freely
and properly discharge the duties that society exacts." Many of these
73. Almost all of the reported cases involving torts committed by parents unre-
lated to the exercise of parental functions deal with automobile accidents.
74. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572C (1970) states as follows:
In all actions for negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, and in all ac-
tions occurring on or after October 1, 1979, for negligence in the operation of an
aircraft or vessel, as defined in Section 15-127, resulting in personal injury,
wrongful death or injury to property, the immunity between parent and child in
such negligence action brought by a parent against his child or by or on behalf of
a child against his parent is abrogated.
N.C. GEN. STAT. Article 43D, § 1-539.21 states as follows:
Abolition of parent-child immunity in motor vehicle cases. The relationship of
parent and child shall not bar the right of action by a minor child against a
parent for personal injury or property damage arising out of the operation of a
motor vehicle owned or operated by such parent.
75. Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wis. 2d 75, 158 N.W. 2d 342 (1968).
76. The following cases are a sampling of the many jurisdictions that follow this
principle: See Rodebaugh v. Grand Truck Western R.R. Co., 4 Mich. App. 559, 145
N.W.2d 401 (1966); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952); Goller v.
I
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courts cite the leading Wisconsin case of Goller v. White77 as persua-
sive authority for this exception to the abrogation of the. immunity
rule. The Goller court retained parental immunity for the following
two situations: (1) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise
of parental authority over the child; and (2) where the alleged negligent
act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to
the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services,
and other care.78 According to the language of the decision, the ques-
tion that must first be decided is one of law as to whether the act falls
within the scope of parental authority and discretion; the question of
the reasonableness of the act has no bearing in this determination. If a
court answers the question in the affirmative, an injured child cannot
bring any action against his parents.
The validity of the rationale underlying this remaining area of im-
munity becomes suspect when analyzing a fact situation involving pa-
rental conduct which would present itself to a court for resolution. If a
child sues his parents on the theory of negligent supervision or care for
injuries incurred in or around the home, the action will, in all likeli-
hood, be instituted by the parents on behalf of the child, and only if
insurance is involved.71 Parental authority and discretion will not be
circumscribed or disrupted in situations such as these. It is true that
the possibility exists that by his own volition, an injured minor, by and
through a guardian ad litem, may sue his parents for negligent care
and supervision when no liability insurance is involved. However, this
may also occur in automobile accident cases and would indicate that
parental authority, discipline, and control has already been dealt a fa-
tal blow."
White, 20 Wis.2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963); Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471
P.2d 282 (1970); Small v. Rockfeld, 66 N.J. 231, 330 A.2d 335 (1974); Plumley v.
Klein, 338 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972); Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Il.App.2d 199,
241 N.E.2d 12 (1968); Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wis.2d 75, 158 N.W.2d 341 (1968);
Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338 (1974); Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465
S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1970).
77. 20 Wis.2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963). The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
had the distinction of becoming the first judicial body in the United States to abrogate
the parental immunity doctrine for injuries negligently inflicted.
78. Id. at 198.
79. Id. at 197.
80. Cole v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 47 Wis.2d 629, 177 N.W.2d 866 (1970).
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The Goller court made specific reference to the importance of in-
surance in negating any possible disturbance to parental discipline and
authority but did not discuss the relationship of insurance to the excep-
tions it carved out."' The court cited the Law of Torts, by Harper and
James 2 as authority for the proposition that an injured child should be
allowed to sue his parents where family harmony is not in jeopardy and
the "reasonableness of family discipline is not involved, '8 3 but it did
not critically apply these factors to parental conduct involving the care
and supervision of children to determine whether a tort action brought
by a minor against his parent would, in reality, have an effect on fam-
ily discipline.
Seven years after GolIer, in Cole v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,4 the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin was presented with the opportunity to
interpret the exceptions to the abrogation of the parental immunity
rule it had earlier delineated. The question at issue was whether the
parents of an injured minor child would be liable, in a third party ac-
tion for contribution, for negligent supervision in allowing their child to
play with a defectively designed swing set when they knew or should
have known of the set's inherently dangerous nature. The court inter-
preted the Goller exceptions very broadly by stating that negligent su-
pervision of a child's play is not an act involving parental discretion
with respect to the care of the child.8" The term "other care" set forth
in the Goller exceptions was deemed not to be so broad in scope as to
cover all parental conduct associated with the family relationship; and,
specifically, parents' supervision of their children at play was held to
fall outside the area where immunity has been retained.8 Parental im-
munity was, by inference, limited to the legal obligations of exercising
authority over, and providing actual necessities to, the child. Since the
great majority of reported cases dealing with strictly parental transac-
tions involve acts of supervision, 7 the immunity exceptions are thus
81. Goller v. White, 20 Wis.2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193, 197 (1963).
82. 1 HARPER AND JAMES, LAW OF ToRTs, 650 § 8.11.
83. Id. at 650.
84. 47 Wis.2d 629, 177 N.W.2d 866 (1970).
85. Id. at 869.
86. Id. at 868.
87. Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wis.2d 75, 158 N.W.2d 341 (1968); Gross v. Sears,
Roebuck and Co., 158 N.J. Super. 442, 386 A.2d 442 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978);
Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa 713, 156 N.W.2d 105 (1968); Holodook v. Spencer, 36
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severely limited in their application.
(3) TOTAL ABROGATION OF IMMUNITY
A number of jurisdictions have completely abolished the parental
immunity rule.m In the leading case of Gibson v. Gibson,9 a minor
sued his father for negligently stopping his car at night on a highway
and instructing his son to go out onto the roadway to correct the posi-
tion of the wheels of the jeep he was towing. After reviewing the immu-
nity rule, the Supreme Court of California recognized the concern
voiced by courts with regard to questions of parental discretion and
supervision and cited Goller as the precedent setting case for the reten-
tion of immunity for such parental conduct. 0
In rejecting the Goller approach, the court summarily rejected the
granting of spheres of influence to parents where their actions could
not be reviewed as a matter of law. Parents could thus act negligently
toward their children with impunity." For example, a child could be
injured by the negligence of his mother in leaving a known defective
electric wire easily within his reach. Pursuant to the Goller exceptions,
the child foreseeably would not have his day in court regardless of the
negligence of his mother and the existence of insurance to pay the dam-
age award. The reasonableness of the mother's actions would not be
reviewed.
A further concern of the Supreme Court of California was the
specte that the courts adopting the Goller rationale would develop a
superstructure of arbitrary and conflicting distinctions as to whether
specific parental conduct lies within the immunity guidelines." The
N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338 (1974). Some courts have interpreted Goller in a different
manner so as to include parental supervision and control as areas where immunity still
remains. See note 94 infra.
88. Gibson v. Gibson, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 479 P.2d 648 (1971); Rupert v. Stienne,
90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Petersen v. City and County of Honolulu, 5 Hawaii
484, 462 P.2d 1007 (1970); Dower v. Goldstein, 143 N.J. Super. 418, 363 A.2d 373
(1976); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971).
89. 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 479 P.2d 648 (1971). The Gibson rationale has been cited
in numerous law review articles which call for the total abrogation of the parent-child
tort immunity rule.
90. Id. at 652.
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emergence of such a structure is already developing as courts spend
much of their time determining if an exception applies in the specific
fact situation as opposed to determining the reasonableness of parental
conduct regardless of any exception." This lack of uniformity in ap-
proach can only lead to confusion as courts concentrate on catego-
rizing a parent's conduct as opposed to analyzing whether any circum-
stances exist for allowing a child's injuries to remain uncompensated.94
The solution proposed by the Supreme Court of California is to
abrogate the parental immunity rule in its entirety and judge parental
conduct according to the following question: "What would an ordina-
rily reasonable and prudent parent have done in similar circim-
stances?"95 A parent is thus held to a standard of reasonableness
viewed in light of the parental role, regardless of the classification of
his conduct.
The California approach will not interfere with the exercise of pa-
rental discretion as long as parental actions are reasonable. To allay
the fears of those who raise the cry of tampering with the parental
prerogative, the court acknowledged that parents must be allowed a
wide range of discretion in the performance of their parental func-
tions." The "reasonable parent" standard should thus be construed to
93. See Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wis.2d 75, 158 N.W.2d 341 (1968). The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin decided that alleged parental negligence in failing to instruct their
child in how to leave a school bus and cross a highway was not actionable since the act
involved the exercise of parental discretion with respect to the care of their child; Gross
v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 158 N.J. Super. 442, 386 A.2d 442 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1978). The Superior Court of New Jersey decided that the alleged negligence of a fa-
ther in mowing his lawn and injuring his child was actionable since the act did not arise
out of the exercise of "parental authority." The entire opinion dealt with whether an
exception was applicable to this fact situation. See also Rodenbaugh v. Grand Trunk
Western R.R. Co., 4 Mich. App. 559, 145 N.W.2d 401 (1966); Holodook v. Spencer,
36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338 (1974).
94. The confusion and lack of uniformity already exists as evidenced by the
number of courts interpreting the Goller exceptions to apply to parental functions in
general, including supervision. Whereas the court that decided Goller has interpreted
the decision to allow actions for parental negligence in supervising their children. See
Cole v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 47 Wis.2d 629, 177 N.W.2d 886 (1970); but see
Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338 (1974); Rodenbaugh v. Grand
Trunk Western R.R. Co., 4 Mich. App. 559, 145 N.W. 2d 401 (1966).
95. Gibson v. Gibson, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 479 P.2d 648, 653 (1971).
96. Id. at 653.
1 46 4:1980 1
22





take into consideration situations where parents may be forgetful or
careless without such conduct being interpreted as stepping beyond rea-
sonable parental behavior. 7 When parental conduct is deemed to be
unreasonable under this standard, the time has possibly arrived for
consideration of the imposition of criminal sanctions 8 and has cer-
tainly arrived for granting a civil remedy to the child to recover for the
damages he has suffered. Such parental conduct should not be
tolerated.
Where the Goller approach gave to parents a "right" to be negli-
gent in the performance of certain parental functions, the Gibson ap-
proach would subject parental conduct to judicial review to determine
whether such conduct was clearly unacceptable and unreasonable in
view of the wide latitude of discretion that should be granted to par-
ents. Given the state interest in insuring the safety and well being of
children, the Gibson rationale is clearly preferable.
3. FLORIDA: BASTION OF PARENT-CHILD TORT
IMMUNITY
Florida's appellate courts first addressed the question of whether a
negligence action could be maintained between a parent and child in
1961 when the Second District Court of Appeal decided Meehan v.
Meehan.99 In Meehan, a father sued his minor son, and others, for the
97. The "Reasonable Parent" Standard: An Alternative to Parent-Child Tort
Immunity, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 795 (1976).
98. The Florida legislature has specifically provided for criminal penalties
against a parent or third party who willfully or through culpable negligence abuses or
maltreats a minor child, or deprives a minor child of necessary food, clothing, shelter
or medical treatment.
FLA. STAT. § 827.03 deals with aggravated child abuse. FLA. STAT. § 827.04 deals
with the willful or culpable deprivation of basic necessities to a minor child and the
knowing or culpable allowance of physical or mental injury to the child. FLA. STAT. §
827.05 deals with an individual, though financially able, negligently depriving a minor
child of basic necessities. FLA. STAT. § 827.07 deals with the abuse of minor children by
willful or negligent acts and provides the procedural mechanisms through which public
agencies come into play to safeguard the welfare of the minor child.
99. 133 So.2d 776 (Fla.2d Dist. Ct. App. 1961). See Russell v. Meehan, 141
So.2d 332 (Fla.2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962). See Shiver v. Session, 80 So.2d 905 (Fla.
1955); Henderson v. Henderson, 14 Fla. Supp. 181 (Cir. Ct. 1958) for the proposition
that minor children are allowed to maintain lawsuits against a parent for the inten-
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wrongful death of another minor son and alleged that the defendant
child was negligent in failing to inform his deceased brother of a
known defective condition of an electric buffing machine when he gave
the machine to him. As a result of the failure to warn, the deceased
child was electrocuted while using the machine.
With no precedent in this state to guide it, the court viewed the
question facing it as solely one involving public policy. In affirming the
summary judgment granted the defendants in the lower court, the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal adopted the position that neither parents nor
their representatives could maintain an action in tort against an un-
emancipated minor child. The rationale advanced for adhering to the
parental immunity rule, prevalent in the majority of jurisdictions at
that time, was the importance of preserving family unity and maintain-
ing family discipline. No discussion appeared relating to whether the
area of immunity the court was creating was justified under the facts of
the case in light of the rationale it cited.
The Second District Court of Appeal again had the opportunity to
review the immunity doctrine in Rickard v. Rickard,' where a seven
year old child, by and through his father, sued his parents for negli-
gence in failing to provide him with a safe place to play. While in his
parents' home, the plaintiff and two of his friends were squirting char-
coal lighter fluid when a match was struck by one of the boys resulting
in plaintiff's clothing being engulfed in flames. In affirming the lower
court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint, the court cited Meehan,101
noting that the rule adopted there should be controlling regardless of
tional killing of the other parent. It would thus seem that although such actions are
statutory in nature, these cases can stand for the broader principle that a child can sue
a parent for an intentional tort.
In Henderson, the Court of Record of Escambia County reviewed and discussed
the parental immunity doctrine as it had developed on the national scene. The court
concluded that although parental immunity should exist where the tort involved the
discharge of parental duties or the exercise of parental control, there was no sound
reason for applying immunity in cases that do not involve parental control and disci-
pline; i.e., automobile accidents where a parent has negligently injured a child. The
court went on to state that this view was the only one "for a court in this enlightened
age to follow." A trial court decision, Henderson has not been cited by appellate courts
in their discussion of the immunity doctrine. However, the reasoning in Henderson was
far more extensive than most of the appellate decisions following it.
100. 203 So.2d 7 (Fla.2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
101. Id. at 8.
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the fact that a minor was now suing his parents, not a parent suing a
minor child. Again, the court emphasized the importance and necessity
of preserving and encouraging family unity and maintaining family dis-
cipline as the policy justifications underlying the parental immunity
rule. 112
Although the court indicated that the immunity rule was not not
absolute and existed only where the suit would disturb family rela-
tions,10° it did not undertake to analyze whether family harmony and
discipline would be disturbed since the father was, in reality, instituting
the action against himself and his wife. The court also did not discuss
the effect of the parents' homeowners' insurance policy which insured
them against personal legal liability for bodily injury to another, nor
were the policy goals the court was attempting to achieve through the
doctrine of immunity delineated. The insurance policy was not deemed
to be material to the action."0 4
The Fourth District Court of Appeal next considered the question
of parental immunity in Denault v. Denault,'°5 where an unemanci-
pated minor child sued her mother for the negligent infliction of inju-
ries sustained in a collision in which the minor was a passenger in the
mother's automobile. This case was of significance since it was the first
in Florida to deal with a negligence action arising out of an automobile
accident. In affirming the lower court's dismissal of the action on the
authority of Meehan"'6 and Rickard,'° the District Court of Appeal did
not discuss the factual differences in the cases or whether such differ-
ences should possibly lead to different results. Meehan and Rickard
involved the exercise of parental duties and discretion peculiar to the
family relation itself, where Denault dealt with a duty to drive with
reasonable care, an obligation which was neither limited to the family
nor involved parental discretion. Furthermore, the court did not men-
tion the existence or non-existence of liability insurance coverage under
the specific facts, and the only conclusion thus to be reached is that it
did not consider this factor important in arriving at its decision.
102. Id.
103. 39 AM. JUR., Parent and Child § 90 (1942).
104. Rickard v. Rickard, 203 So.2d 7 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
105. 220 So.2d 27 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
106. 133 So.2d 776 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
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In 1970, the Florida Supreme Court decided Orefice v. Albert,08 a
decision which remains the leading case in Florida on the subject of
parent-child tort immunity.' In Orefice, a minor and his father were
both killed in an airplane crash due to the negligence of the father-pilot
who was also the co-owner of the airplane. On the basis of the parental
immunity rule, the court held that as a matter of law, lawsuits brought
by the mother, in her own right and as a parent, and by the estate of
the deceased minor child, would be barred. The court indicated that
established policy in Florida prevented children from suing their par-
ents and that such policy was grounded upon the protection of family
harmony and resources,"' although no prior Florida decision had ever
mentioned the preservation of family resources as a reason for uphold-
ing the immunity rule.
There was no discussion by the court as to whether the policies
underlying the immunity doctrine would be appicable to the facts of
the case since both the father and son were killed, and the family rela-
tionship was thus terminated. As in Denault," no statement appeared
regarding the existence of liability insurance and its effect upon the
preservation of family harmony and resources. The Florida Supreme
Court followed the lead of the district courts of appeal that had previ-
ously considered the parental immunity question by repeating general
policy statements without critically examining whether the application
of the immunity rule in the particular case furthered these declared
policy goals.
In 1972, the Third District Court of Appeal first reviewed the im-
munity rule in Webb v. Allstate Insurance Co.,"2 where a nine year old
child, through a guardian, brought an action against his father, his fa-
ther's automobile liability insurer, his father's employer and the em-
ployer's insurer. The plaintiff had accompanied his father to work
where the father became so intoxicated that several fellow employees
discussed having someone drive him and his son home. The father then
took a vehicle belonging to his employer and, while driving home with
108. 237 So.2d 142 (Fla. 1970).
109. Id. Orefice has been cited by all subsequent cases in Florida involving the
question of tort immunity between parents and children.
110. Id. at 145.
111. 220 So.2d 27 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
112. Webb v. Allstate Ins. Co., 258 So.2d 840 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
o
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his son as a passenger, negligently collided with the rear of another car
causing injuries to the child. The court affirmed the lower court's
granting of a summary judgment in favor of the father and his insurer
on the ground that, as a matter of law, an unemancipated minor child
cannot maintain an action against his parents for negligence.
Although the father's liability insurance carrier was a named party
defendant, nowhere in the opinion was the importance of insurance
mentioned as it related to the policies underlying the immunity rule.
The court also did not analyze whether the father's voluntary intoxica-
tion removed the shield of immunity surrounding him by making his
actions so grossly negligent and/or willful and wanton that he com-
pletely departed from his parental role. 13 As in prior Florida cases, this
district court of appeal justified its legal position solely on the basis of
broad statements of general public policy. The circumstances of the
particular case were not considered.
The same year Webb was decided, the Second District Court of
Appeal, in Vinci v. Gensler,"' applied the parental immunity rule to a
tragic situation where an entire family, consisting of a mother, father,
and two minor children, died in an airplane accident caused by the
alleged negligent operation or maintenance of the airplane by the de-
ceased father. The personal representative of the estates of the mother
and children brought an action against the administrator of the father's
estate and Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, the liability insurer of
the subject airplane. The policies underlying the disability of the child's
suit against his parents were not even mentioned in this per curiam
decision which upheld the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiff's
complaint.
The dissent in Vinci was lengthy and sharp in its criticism of the
majority's failure to scrutinize the "mistaken axioms and ill-founded
reasons" upon which the parental immunity rule was based; and fur-
ther alleged that "in this particular case even those ill-founded reasons
are absent." 5 Since no family member survived the crash, the disrup-
tion of family harmony, the danger of fraud and collusion, the destruc-
tion of parental discipline and control and the raid on family resources,
all often quoted reasons for the maintenance of immunity, were ren-
113. Id. at 841.
114. 269 So.2d 20 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
115. Id. at 22.
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dered moot. The existence of liability insurance, in and of itself, would
render most of these rationales inapplicable to this and all cases involv-
ing the immunity rule. The majority did not address itself to any of
these issues.
The parent-child tort immunity rule is strongly entrenched in Flor-
ida tort law."' In decisions consistently upholding the immunity doc-
trine, Florida courts have resisted the changes in the rule that are being
proposed and adopted in a majority of courts throughout the country.
4. PARENT-CHILD TORT IMMUNITY: AN
ANACHRONISM IN FLORIDA TORT LAW
Florida has experienced rapid change in its tort law in the 1970's
with the judicial adoption of comparative negligence in 1973,117 the
statutory waiver in 1973 of sovereign immunity for tort actions,"' the
legislative enactment in 1975 of the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act (UCATA),"9 and the judicial adoption of strict liabil-
ity in tort in 1976.20 Changes such as these have led the First District
Court of Appeal to state:
In view of the recent developments in the tort field, the abrogation of
contributory negligence, the adoption of comparative negligence, the en-
actment of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, and
others, the time may be ripe for the abrogation of the family immunity
doctrine. It appears that this would be consistent with the recent devel-
opment that a loss should be apportioned among those whose fault con-
tributed to the event, as well as providing for contribution among joint
tortfeasors. 21
In abrogating the doctrine of contributory negligence and adopting
a pure comparative negligence system, the Florida Supreme Court em-
phasized its concern for the automobile accident problem and the need
to secure just and adequate compensation for accident victims.12 The
116. Horton v. Unigard Ins. Co., 355 So.2d 154 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
117. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
118. FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (1973).
119. FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1975).
120. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Inc., 336 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1978).
121. Mieure v. Moore, 330 So.2d 546, 547 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
122. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
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court was also concerned with adopting a more socially desirable
method of loss distribution so that when the negligence of more than
one person contributed to an accident causing injuries, each tortfeasor
should pay the proportionate share of the total damages he had caused
the injured party.'2
Shortly after the adoption of comparative negligence, Justice
Dekle, in a special concurring opinion in Ward v. Ochoa 24 noted that
Florida's common law doctrine preventing contribution among joint
tortfeasors was inconsistent with its newly adopted doctrine of appor-
tionment of fault.'2 To accomplish complete equity in determining lia-
bility and in achieving a more desirable method of loss distribution, the
UCATA was untimely adopted,128 permitting contribution when two or
more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same
injury.
The widespread availability and use of liability insurance has
played an important role in the judicial adoption of comparative negli-
gence and the legislative enactment of the UCATA. 2 1 When the doc-
trines of fault and contributory negligence first came into prominence
during the period of the Industrial Revolution,12u the legal question to
then be decided was solely whether a loss should fall on the plaintiff or
defendant. Liability insurance against accidents was unknown until the
latter part of the nineteenth century. 2 Such insurance is the vehicle by
which the burden of bearing losses is shifted from the individual to all
the policyholders benefiting from the insured activities. 3 ' Accident vic-
tims may be compensated and human suffering may be lessened by
apportioning fault and allocating losses through insurance.'
In addition to these methods for providing adequate compensation
for accident victims and distributing losses, the legislature has also in-
123. Id. at 437.
124. 284 So.2d 385 (Fla. 1973).
125. Id. at 388.
126. FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1975).
127. See Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A Needed
Law Reform, I I U. FLA. L. REV. 135 (1958).
128. Id. at 137.
129. Id. at 138.
130. James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance,
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dicated its interest in this area by its enactment of the Florida Automo-
bile Reparations Reform Act in 1971.132 This act requires every owner
or registrant of a motor vehicle in this state to show proof of security
by an insurance policy 33 or other means provided by the Financial Re-
sponsibility Law.134 The purpose of such security is to provide for pay-
ment of personal injury protection benefits to certain designated indi-
viduals, regardless of fault, for specifically delineated medical expenses
and services, funeral expenses and disability benefits."' By recognizing
and primarily employing the mechanism of insurance, the legislature
has thus provided a means for guaranteeing the payment of specified
amounts to an injured victim by a distribution of losses borne by the
total group of policyholders.
The Florida Supreme Court again emphasized the tort goals of
accident victim compensation and the distribution of losses resulting
from such compensation .by its adoption of the theory of strict liability
in tort. 36 The court characterized the doctrine of strict liability as one
of "enterprise liability" where the cost of injuries should be borne by
the makers of products who place them in commerce, rather than by
the injured persons who are usually powerless to protect themselves. 37
Strict liability was held applicable to not only users and consumers of
defective products, but also to foreseeable bystanders who might be
injured by such products.13 1
The theory of enterprise liability is based, in part, on the concept
of "risk spreading" whereby manufacturers absorb the inevitable losses
incurred as a result of the use of their products by passing such losses
on to the public.'39 Manufacturers are in a better position to spread this
risk by insuring themselves against the risk of injuries and distributing
132. FLA. STAT. §§ 627.730-.741 (1975).
133. FLA. STAT. § 627.733 (1975).
134. FLA. STAT. § 324.031 (1975).
135. FLA. STAT. § 627.731 (1975).
136. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Inc., 336 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1978).
137. Id. at 92.
138. Id. at 88. The strict liability doctrine set forth in the RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) was adopted by the Florida Supreme Court. The lan-
guage of the RESTATEMENT applies strict liability to users and consumers of products,
but public policy considerations surrounding the concepts of enterprise liability are
equally applicable to innocent bystanders.
139. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L. J. 1099, 1120 (1960).
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the price of such insurance to the public as a cost of doing business.14
Although few courts have overtly discussed the importance of liability
insurance and its relationship to the theory of enterprise liability, a
number of writers have emphasized such insurance as critical to the
theory's vitality.1 41
The continued failure of Florida's courts to permit a minor child
to recover against his parents for injuries negligently inflicted is incon-
gruous in view of these clearly delineated tort goals and policies. The
compensation of accident victims and the distribution of losses through
the vehicle of liability insurance is clearly hampered by the immunity
rule.
5. PARENTAL IMMUNITY AND THE UCATA
The Florida courts were recently faced with a series of cases in
which the avowed goals of fault apportionment 14  and loss distribu-
tion"' came into direct confrontation with the parental immunity
rule.14 All of the cases involved the question as to whether a tortfeasor
could obtain contribution from another tortfeasor who was immune
from suit by the injured party because of either parental or inter-
spousal immunity. In Mieure v. Moore,"' a case involving injuries suf-
fered in an automobile accident, the First District Court of Appeal
answered the question in the negative, unanimously finding that the
negligent father/husband was not a joint tortfeasor with the third party
defendant seeking contribution from him since, on the basis of the fam-
ily immunity rule, there was no common liability to the injured chil-
140. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944).
141. Prosser, supra at 1121.
142. See note 121 supra.
143. See note 123 supra.
144. Mieure v. Moore, 330 So.2d 546 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Paoli v.
Shor, 345 So.2d 789 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Shor v. Paoli, 353 So.2d 825 (Fla.
1977); 3-M Electric Corp. v. Vigoa, 369 So.2d 405 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979);
Florida Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 371 So.2d 166 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Petrick v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., - So.2d - (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1979) [1979 FLW 758]. In each of these cases, a third party sought contribu-
tion from the negligent spouse and/or child of the injured victim or the liability insur-
ance carrier of such spouse or child.
145. 330 So.2d 546 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
14:1980
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dren and wife who were plaintiffs."' The court considered itself bound
by established precedent to reach its decision, and it called on the Flor-
ida Supreme Court to review the wisdom of retaining the family immu-
nity rule in light of recent developments in Florida tort law.14
Approximately one year after Mieure was decided, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal, in Paoli v. Shor,48 considered a very similar
question when a plaintiff husband was injured while a passenger in an
automobile being driven by his wife where both the wife and a third
party were negligent. In allowing the contribution claim by the negli-
gent third party against the wife, the majority of the court held, contra
to Mieure, that the doctrine of interspousal immunity does not bar a
right of contribution that would otherwise exist under the UCATA. To
hold otherwise, the majority found, would be unfair to the defendant
and a windfall to the tortfeasor wife.' The dissent noted that the effect
of the majority opinion is to "dilute and compromise" the family im-
munity doctrine since according to such doctrine, the wife and third
party cannot be considered joint tortfeasors for the purpose of allowing
146. Id. at 547. See Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 1108. Until the last decade, most
courts that have considered this question have denied a third party tortfeasor the right
of contribution from a parent or child on the ground that the essential element of
contribution, namely common liability of the tortfeasors to the injured person, is lack-
ing. See also London Guarantee and Accident Co. v. Smith, 242 Minn. 211, 64 S.W.2d
781 (1954); Scruggs v. Meredith, 135 F. Supp. 376 (D. Hawaii 1955); Lewis v. Farm
Bureau Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 243 N.C. 55, 89 S.E.2d 788 (1955); Strahorn v.
Sears, Roebuck and Co., 50 Del. 50, 123 A.2d 107 (Super. Ct. 1956); Chosney v.
Konkus, 64 N.J. Super. 328, 165 A.2d 870 (Essex County Ct. 1960). However, a num-
ber of courts that have recently addressed themselves to this issue have allowed contri-
bution claims to take precedence over the rules of parent-child tort immunity or inter-
spousal immunity. See Peterson v. City and County of Honolulu, 51 Ha% aii 484, 462
P.2d 1007 (1970); France v. A.P.A. Transport Corp., 57 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490
(1969); Hayon v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of New England, 378 N.E.2d 442 (Mass.
1978); Zarrella v. Miller, 100 R.I. 545, 217 A.2d 673 (1966); Ross v. Atwell, 315 So.2d
333 (La. Ct. App. 1975); Perchell v. District of Columbia, 444 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
147. Mieure v. Moore, 330 So.2d 546 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976). Although
this case involved interspousal tort immunity, the policy concerns and issues involved
are the same as in the consideration of the parent-child immunity rule. Furthermore,
reference is made in the case to the broad doctrine of family immunity.
148. 345 So.2d 789 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
149. Id. at 790.
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contribution. 50
The Florida Supreme Court, in Shor v. Paoli,5 ' responded to the
Fourth District's certified question' by affirming the majority position
and adopting its reasoning. Both courts stated that permitting contri-
bution would not destroy the family unit and thus would not injure the
very underpinning of the family immunity doctrine.1 3
However, a closer look at Shor indicates that by favoring the tort
objectives of fault apportionment and loss distribution, the Florida Su-
preme Court's opinion did, on its face, do violence to the family immu-
nity rule it so clearly delineated in the leading case of Orefice v. Al-
bert.' The Orefice court stated that the preservation of family
harmony and resources was the cornerstone of the immunity rule. By
allowing a negligent third party to obtain contribution against a spouse
or child, the court is denying full recovery to the injured family mem-
ber since the family unit, which in reality must be looked upon as a
whole, is not receiving the full amount of compensation that would be
due the victim. Family resources are thus drained because such re-
sources must be used to fully compensate the injured party and as a
result, family harmony may be threatened due to the costly negligence
of the family member."'
150. Id. at 791.
151. 353 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1977).
152. Paoli v. Shor, 345 So.2d 789, 790 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977). The ques-
tion certified by the Fourth District Court of Appeal to the Florida Supreme Court
was as follows:
DOES THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE OF INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY CONTROL OVER
THE UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG JOINT TORTFEASORS ACT (75-108 LAWS OF
FLORIDA, SECTION 768.31, FLORIDA STATUTES) TO PREVENT ONE TORTFEASOR
FROM SEEKING A CONTRIBUTION FROM ANOTHER TORTFEASOR WHEN THE OTHER
TORTFEASOR IS THE SPOUSE OF THE INJURED PERSON WHO RECEIVED DAMAGES
FROM THE FIRST TORTFEASOR?
The court certified this question due to the obvious conflict of its opinion with that of
the opinion of the First District Court of Appeal in Mieure v. Moore, 330 So.2d 546
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
153. Id. at 790; Shor v. Paoli, 353 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1977).
154. 237 So.2d 142 (Fla. 1970).
155. Underlying the court's decision in Shor v. Paoli, supra must have been an
awareness that the existence of liability insurance would prevent the disturbance of
family harmony and resources. Otherwise, its policy goals would have been in jeop-
ardy. The liability insurance carriers of both the plaintiff and defendant were named
parties in interest. The Florida Supreme Court, following the pattern set by other Flor-
P m
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The court's decision in Shor has marked a judicial retreat from its
strict adherence to the parental immunity rule. The UCATA is to be
liberally interpreted to achieve the tort goals of fault apportionment
and loss distribution; neither the interspousal tort immunity rule nor
the parent-child tort immunity rule are to hinder their accomp-
lishment.156
The First District Court of Appeal has very recently strengthened
the controlling position of the UCATA over the parental immunity
rule in two cases dealing with family exclusion clauses in automobile
ida courts in their consideration of this doctrine, did not directly confront the family
immunity issue by relating the facts of the particular case to policy concerns.
156. See Judge Mager's special concurring opinion in Paoli v. Shor, supra where
he quoted with approval from Zarrella v. Miller, 100 R.I. 545, 217 A.2d 673 (1966), an
opinion which gave precedence to the UCATA over the interspousal immunity doctrine
prevalent in that state. Judge Mager quoted as follows:
[W]e cannot believe that in enacting such act the legislature intended to extend
the doctrine of interspousal immunity to actions under the act in the light of
modern-day conditions. Such intent would be contrary to common sense and
justice. We are convinced that the legislature intended contribution in a case
such as this. We agree with the words of Dean Prosser that 'There is obvious
lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the entire burden of a loss, for
which two defendants were equally unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered
onto one alone * * * while the latter goes scot free.'
PROSSER, TORTS 2d 3d., Chap. 8 § 46, p. 248. However, in 3-M Electric Corp. v.
Vigoa, 369 So.2d 405 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979), the Third District Court of Appeal
retreated, in part, from Shor in its interpretation of the UCATA. Parents sued an
electrical contractor on behalf of their minor child, alleging that the child was injured
by the contractor's negligence in leaving a pipe protruding in their backyard. The court
denied the contractor's counterclaim for contribution against the parents stating that
there was a lack of common liability between the parents and defendant due to the
family immunity doctrine. The court simply stated that the "instant case remains
within the parameters of the Mieure decision in regard to precluding contribution from
the parents." No policy or other rationale was offered regarding the purposes of the
UCATA or the tort objective of loss distribution. This case differs from the others
involving the UCATA in that contribution was sought against parents for their negli-
gent supervision of the injured child, and not for their negligent operation of a vehicle.
If contribution is allowed in this case, and the parents are without liability insurance or
are under-insured, then a part of anything the child recovers against the defendant will
have to come out of the family's resources. This is, in all probability, the reason why
the Third District Court of Appeal distinguished this case from Shor. See also, Schnei-
der v. Coe, - A.2d - (Del. 1979).
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liability insurance policies.1"' In Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Co. v.
Government Employees Insurance Company,158 a wife, injured in an
accident while a passenger in a vehicle being driven by her husband,
sued the third party driver, owner, and the owner's insurer for negli-
gence. After paying the damage award to the wife, the defendant in-
surer filed a third party complaint against the husband's insurer seek-
ing contribution. The husband's insurer denied coverage based upon a
family exclusion clause in its policy which precluded coverage "to bod-
ily injury or to death of the insured or any member of the family of the
insured residing in the same household." ' The court affirmed the trial
court's allowance of the contribution claim and stated that Shor v.
Paoli had clearly given the UCATA precedence over the doctrine of
interspousal immunity. 6' Family exclusion clauses were contrary to the
established public policy of apportioning joint tortfeasors' responsibil-
ity for the payment of claims of innocent injured parties."'
In Petrik v. New Hampshire Insurance Co.,' decided by the First
District on the same day as Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Co., the
court applied the same rationale to allow a third party contribution
against a child's insurer when the parents of the child were injured in
an accident due to the negligence of both the third party and the child.
The family exclusion clause in the child's liability insurance policy was
found to be against public policy. In both cases, the First District certi-
fied questions to the Florida Supreme Court.,'
157. Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Co. v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 371
So.2d 166 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Petrick v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., - So.2d
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979) [1979 FLW 758].
158. 371 So.2d 166 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
159. Id. at 167.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. - So.2d - (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979) [1979 FLW 758].
163. In Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Co., note 157 supra, the court certified
the following question:
DOES A FAMILY EXCLUSION CLAUSE IN AN AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE POL-
ICY CONTROL OVER THE UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TROTFEASORS ACT TO
PREVENT ONE TORTFEASOR FROM SEEKING CONTRIBUTION FROM ANOTHER
TORTFEASOR WHEN THE OTHER TORTFEASOR IS THE SPOUSE OF THE INJURED PER-
SON WHO HAS RECEIVED DAMAGES FROM THE FIRST TORTFEASOR?
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It is time for the Florida Supreme Court to critically examine the
parental immunity rule in light of its avowed goals of accident victim
compensation, fault apportionment and loss distribution as evidenced
by the judicial adoption of comparative negligence and strict liability in
tort, the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity for tort actions and
the legislative enactment of both the Florida Automobile Reparations
Reform Act and the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.
The importance of liability insurance to the accomplishment of these
goals must be recognized. The increasing number of questions certified
to the high court indicate the confusion in this area and the friction
between the maintenance of the immunity rule and the policies in tort
law being espoused by our legislature and courts."6 4 The present law
barring an injured minor child from suing a parent continues to perpet-
uate the human suffering which our legal system has been attempting
to alleviate.
If the policy reasons which gave birth to the parental immunity
rule are no longer valid, it is within the authority of the Florida Su-
preme Court to change or abrogate the doctrine.16 Preservation of
family harmony and resources can no longer be cited as unquestioned
DOES A FAMILY EXCLUSION CLAUSE IN AN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICY CON-
TROL OVER THE UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT TO PREVENT
ONE TORTFEASOR FROM SEEKING CONTRIBUTION FROM ANOTHER TORTFEASOR?
As of this date, neither of the above two certified questions have been answered by the
Florida Supreme Court.
164. Furthermore, the parental immunity rule intrinsically conflicts with the well
established principle of Florida tort law that an injured third party may, under certain
circumstances, sue a parent on the theory of negligent care and control over his child
as the causative factor of the injuries. See Gissen v. Goodwill, 80 So.2d 701 (Fla.
1955); Seabrook v. Taylor, 199 So.2d 315 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Spector v.
Neer, 262 So.2d 689 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Southern American Fire Ins. Co. v.
Maxwell, 274 So.2d 579 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
Allowing such actions by third parties against parents who are negligent may dis-
turb family unity and drain family resources. Liability insurance is more unlikely to
exist in situations such as these than in the typical parental immunity case with the
result that the damage award must be paid by the parents themselves. There is no
compelling reason for granting a third party the right to sue a parent by denying such a
right to an injured child. This is especially true in light of the fact that in situations
where a child sues a parent, the suit will invariably be brought only with the consent of
the parents and only if liability insurance is present. See note 46 supra.
165. Mieure v. Moore, 330 So.2d 546 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Paoli v.
Shor, 345 So.2d 789, 791 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (Alderman, J., dissenting).
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policy arguments for the maintenance of such immunity. In fact, the
continuted existence of parental immunity threatens the family har-
mony and resources which the doctrine was meant to preserve. 166
The recent Florida cases dealing with the family immunity doc-
trine and the UCATA have created cracks in a dam of unyielding
dogma whose time for a critical review has arrived. A setback in the
attempt to deal with losses suffered by accident victims occurs each
time a court precludes an injured child from recovering, as a matter of
law, against his parents and against, in the overwhelming number of
cases, his parent's liability insurer.
CONCLUSION
One of the greatest strengths of the common law is its flexibility
and capacity to change, grow and adapt to new conditions and develop-
ments in society" 7 so as to provide remedies to all wrongs commit-
ted.16 Courts have tended to implement such change gradually by "dif-
ferentiation, exception, and ultimately extinction" of outmoded legal
doctrines. 69 In the grand tradition of the common law, recent years
have seen the edifice of family immunity beginning to crumble. The
time has come to set aside the parent-child tort immunity rule along
with all of the exceptions and limitations that have grown around it.
The cries of justice must be heard and a remedy provided for what, in
reality, is our most precious resource, our children.
166. See cases cited note 72, supra.
167. 15 AM.JUR.2d Common Law § 2 (1976).
168. 11 Am.JuR., Common Law § 2 (1937).
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